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Aurélien Baillon (1980) is Endowed Professor of Economics of Uncertainty and a former
student of the École Normale Supérieure de Cachan, one of the French Grande Écoles. He joined
Erasmus School of Economics in 2007, after obtaining a research master at the Toulouse School
of Economics and a PhD at Arts et Métiers ParisTech. His research interests include decision
making under uncertainty and the measurement of people’s expectations and confidence. In the
past years, he has received important recognition for his research contributions, including a Veni
and a Vidi grant from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO.), and earlier
this year, a Starting Grant from the European Research Council (ERC). His research has been
published in leading journals, including the American Economic Review.
The focus of the lecture is the measurement of subjective truths. On the one hand,
economists heavily rely on hard numbers: GDP, growth rate, and exchange rates. On the other
hand, their explanations often rely on soft factors: executive confidence in the economy, consu -
mer sentiment, and investor expectations. The hard numbers are objective and agreed upon,
but the soft factors are subjective and depend on each individual. Economists increasingly
recognize the need to study subjective factors. After explaining the role of subjective truths in
modern economics, the lecture will show how to objectively measure subjective factors, even
though they may not be verifiable.
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onder -
zoek school) in the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding
participants of ERIM are the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus
School of Econo mics (ESE). ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially accre dited by the
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research under taken by ERIM
is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and interfirm
relations, and its busi ness processes in their interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage ment, and to offer an
ad vanced doctoral pro gramme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred
senior researchers and PhD candidates are active in the different research pro grammes. From
a variety of acade mic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM commu nity is united in striving
for excellence and working at the fore front of creating new business knowledge.
Inaugural Addresses Research in Management contain written texts of inaugural
addresses by members of ERIM. The addresses are available in two ways, as printed hard -
copy booklet and as digital fulltext file through the ERIM Electronic Series Portal.
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Samenvatting
Aan de ene kant zijn economen sterk afhankelijk van harde cijfers: het BBP,
groeicijfers, wisselkoersen. Aan de andere kant, baseren zij hun uitleg vaak op
zachte factoren: het vertrouwen van managers in de economie, de stemming
van de consument en de beleggers verwach tingen. De harde cijfers zijn objectief,
maar de zachte factoren zijn subjectief en individu-afhankelijk. Economen
erkennen steeds meer de behoefte om subjectieve factoren te bestuderen. Het
eerste deel van de oratie gaat in op de sleutelrol van subjectieve waarheden in
de moderne economie. Zo wordt voorgesteld om het BBP te vervangen door de
subjectieve mate van welzijn, of op zijn minst hiermee te comple menteren;
economisch beleid wordt vaak gebaseerd op subjectieve prognoses door des -
kun digen.
Het tweede deel van de lezing zal aantonen dat zelfs de zachte factoren, ook
al zijn ze subjectief, objectief kunnen worden bestudeerd. In het bijzonder zullen
we zien hoe je mensen kan stimuleren hun verwachtingen maar ook hun
vertrouwen over toekomstige gebeurte nissen te onthullen. Tenslotte zal ik laten
zien hoe je mensen waarheden kan laten onthullen die volledig oncontroleer -
baar zijn.
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Abstract
On the one hand, economists heavily rely on hard numbers: GDP, growth rate,
and exchange rates. On the other hand, their explanations often rely on soft
factors: executive confidence in the economy, consumer sentiment, and investor
expectations. The hard numbers are objective, but the soft factors are subjective
and depend on each individual. Economists increasingly recognize the need to
study subjective factors. The first part of the lecture illustrates the key role of
subjective truths in modern economics. For instance, measures of subjective
well-being are now being proposed to replace or at least complement GDP.
Economic policies often rely on subjective forecasting by experts. 
The second part of the lecture will show that even though they are sub -
jective, the soft factors can still be studied objectively. We will see how to
incentivize people to reveal their expectations about future events but also their
confidence in their expectations. Finally, I will show how to make people reveal
truths that are completely unverifiable.
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1. Introduction
Dear Rector Magnificus,
Dear Dean of the Erasmus School of Economics,
Dear colleagues, students, friends, and family,
Dear distinguished guests,
Economists sometimes seem to be schizophrenic. On the one hand, they love
hard numbers: GDP, growth rates, and exchange rates. On the other hand, their
explanations often rely on soft factors: executive confidence in the economy,
consumer sentiment, and investor expectations.
The hard numbers are objective: independent of the observer, and agreed
upon. The soft factors are subjective: “influenced by personal feelings, tastes,
and opinions”; they are “dependent on the mind for existence” (Oxford Dictio -
nary). For instance, the statement “I feel good” is subjective. 
Behavioural economist George Loewenstein recently said: “Our perception
of, and reaction to, reality is subjective. How you feel about products, or even
about your life, is at least as important, and probably much more important,
than the product or your life’s objective characteristics.” Economists increasingly
recognize the need to study subjective factors. And even though they are sub -
jective, we can still objectivelymeasure and study them. In the present lecture, I
will illustrate the need to study subjective truths, and explain methods to do so.
These methods are based on the typical economist’s toolbox, such that we will
no longer be “schizophrenic”. 
As economists, we study people’s choices – their decisions. Our theories tell
us how to interpret the choices. I will describe methods based on people making
decisions and being rewarded when they decide to tell the truth. Respondents
may bear a cognitive cost to find or report the right answer. Rewarding truth-
telling compensates those who provide efforts and bear this cost.
The first part of the lecture illustrates the key role of subjective truths in
modern economics. The second part focuses on how to incentivise people for
revealing their expectations about future events. The third and last part
describes the challenge of measuring unverifiable truths: the truths that are
completely subjective and not even linked to any verifiable events.
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2. Subjective truths in economics
2.1. New welfare measurements
Following the work of Easterlin in the 1970s, a large and dynamic field
measures how happy people are with their life. Welfare has long been restricted to
measures of wealth or income. Nobel Prize winners Kahneman, Sen, and Stiglitz
have argued in favour of measuring people’s subjective well-being to replace or at
least complement GDP (Kahneman et al. 2004 and Stiglitz et al. 2009).
Kahneman and Deaton (2010) showed that global life satisfaction (bold line
“ladder” in Figure 1) increases with income, but that emotional well-being
(measured by questions about recent emotional experiences) does not increase
beyond an annual income of $75,000. For low incomes, a higher annual income
decreases the tendency to feel blue and stressed, and increases the tendency to
be in a positive affect (reporting happiness, smiling, and enjoyment). But it does
not have any clear positive effect beyond $75,000. These results illustrate how
measures of subjective well-being may lead to different conclusions than
measures of material well-being. 
In 2009, in France, the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi commission proposed new
guidelines to measure social progress, and recommended a shift from economic
production to well-being. Recognising the importance of life satisfaction, the
OECD has recently published guidelines to obtain reliable and consistent
measures. At this university, the Erasmus Happiness Economics Research Orga -
nisation (EHERO) is dedicated to economics research on happiness.
If GDP is to be replaced by subjective measures of welfare, we need to ensure
the quality of these measures. A challenge is that no-one can verify whether
someone who claims to be happy actually is happy. In the last part of the talk, I
will come back to this challenge.
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Figure 1: “Positive affect, blue affect, stress, and life evaluation in relation to household
income. Positive affect is the average of the fractions of the population reporting happiness,
smiling, and enjoyment. “Not blue” is 1 minus the average of the fractions of the population
reporting worry and sadness. “Stress free” is the fraction of the population who did not
report stress for the previous day. These three hedonic measures are marked on the left-hand
scale. The ladder is the average reported number on a scale of 0–10, marked on the right-
hand scale.” From Kahneman and Deaton (2010)
A
U
R
É
L
IE
N
 B
A
IL
L
O
N
S
U
B
JE
C
T
IV
E
 T
R
U
T
H
S
12
Page 12; B&T1510 Baillon binnen
2.2.Beyond rational expectations
A second example of the use of subjective truths in economics is related to
expectations. Let me start with a brief story. In developing countries, the absence
of health insurance can expose households to health care expenditures that
may exceed their resources. It may thus force them to sacrifice assets or to
increase debts. The lack of health insurance can therefore be a serious obstacle
on the development path. To overcome this obstacle, many initiatives have been
taken to propose affordable health insurance.
Potential demand for health insurance has been shown to be sufficient for a
sustainable insurance market (Pauly et al. 2009). Yet, attempts to provide health
insurance have resulted in enrolment rates of between 1% and 10% (De Allegri et
al. 2009), far below what was predicted. How could the predictions be so wrong?
To estimate potential demand for insurance, economists relied on objective
data on risk prevalence. The rational expectations paradigm, central in econo -
mics, assumes that economic agents use all available information to derive
objectively correct beliefs about the risks they face. This paradigm leads econo -
mists to equate agents’ beliefs with the objective statistical information about
the risks. But there are many reasons why agents’ actual beliefs may differ from
this statistical information.
Starting with Tversky and Kahneman (1974), psychological research has
shown that beliefs can be miscalibrated, which leads to overconfidence or over -
optimism, and hence, irrational expectations. In the 1980s, researchers showed
how people tended to be unrealistically optimistic about the risks they faced. For
instance, in a study about perceptions of health-related risks, Weinstein (1987)
asked participants to compare the likelihood of experiencing some given health
problems compared to others of the same gender and age. They responded on a
–3 (much less likely to face the problem) to a +3 (much more likely to face the
problem) response scale. On average, it should be 0, but the average was always
negative. People thought they were less likely to face addiction problems, to have
a nervous breakdown, or to get lung cancer than others, therefore exhibiting
unrealistic optimism.
Not only may people have biased beliefs, they may also have different
degrees of confidence in their beliefs. In 1921, in “A Treatise on Probability”, John
Maynard Keynes pointed out that the amount of evidence a person has to
support his beliefs might be as crucial as the beliefs themselves. Hence, we
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should not only consider what people believe, but also how much they trust
what they believe, to fully understand and predict people’s behaviour. 
Possibly biased beliefs and different degrees of confidence in beliefs con -
stitute the two main deviations from rational expectations. But if these factors
are irrational, should economists still take them into account? John Neville
Keynes, father of John Maynard, distinguished normative economics (studying
what ought to be), from positive economics (studying what is) and applied
economics, which he also called “the art of economics”, and which establishes
precepts to improve what is. Rational expectations can help to define what
ought to be, but in positive or applied economics, we need to observe what
people actually expect. We need to measure their subjective expectations. This
is, for instance, what I am doing with my health economist colleagues Owen
O’Donnell, Ellen van de Poel and Kim van Wilgenburg. We are currently working
on a survey to measure expectations about medical expenditures in the
Philippines.
2.3.Holding experts accountable
In many cases, risks cannot be objectively quantifiable, and governmental
policies have to rely on subjective risk estimates. For example, Sims (2002)
studied the decision processes of four central banks: the Swedish Riksbank, the
European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the U.S. Federal Reserve. He
found that “in each of the four central banks, ‘subjective’ forecasting, based on
data analysis by sectorial ‘experts,’ plays an important role.”
To estimate the risks related to global warming, we cannot rely on frequen -
cies derived from past observations. Climate experts develop models which
incorporate all the information they have about the impact of human activities
and their future development. But they also have to choose which models, which
parameters, and which scenarios are more likely (Schneider 2002).
The first part of this lecture consisted of three examples of the role of
subjective truths in modern economics. If subjective truths are playing such an
increasing role, we should make sure that they are correctly measured. For
instance, if economic policies are based on subjective estimates of experts, then
we have to make sure that these experts tell the truth and are held accountable
for their claim. The second part of the lecture will describe methods to do so,
starting with a method initially developed to hold weather forecasters account -
able for forecast accuracy. 
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3. Measuring subjective expectations
3.1. Scoring rules and prediction markets
In the first half of the 20th century, weather forecasting developed quickly,
but also led to a new question: how can we know whether the forecast is right? If
forecasters say it might rain with a probability of 20% and it actually rains, the
forecast is not completely wrong. So how can we reward them?
In 1950, Glenn W. Brier, a researcher at the US Weather Bureau, proposed the
use of a scoring rule. Forecasters report their subjective probability and receive a
score that depends on the assessed probability and on the event occurring (or
not). The Brier score is computed such that forecasters who maximise their
expected scores have incentives to tell the truth – their subjective truth. This can
be used to reward the experts, identify the best ones, but also to teach them how
to become better experts by providing feedback.
Figure 2: Expected scores given by the quadratic scoring rules for different subjective
probabilities. The orange line represents the expected score if the forecaster’s subjective
probability is 10%, the blue line represents the expected score if the forecaster’s subjective
probability is 70%.
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The most famous scoring rule is the quadratic scoring rule. Formally, if the
forecaster reports that the probability of rain is 𝑟, he receives 1−1−𝑟2 if it rains
and 1−𝑟2 if it does not rain. Figure 2 displays the expected score as a function of
𝑟. The orange curve is the expected score if the forecaster believes it will rain with
a probability of 10%, and the blue curve is the expected score if he believes the
probability is 70%. The graphs shows that the maximum score is reached if the
forecaster reports his true belief.
Another approach to measure expectations is to study people’s willingness
to bet on an event. Consider a bet that pays €1 if it rains and nothing otherwise.
A person maximising her expected gains and whose certainty equivalent for this
bet is €0.40 reveals that her subjective probability for the event “it rains” is 40%.
This mechanism is used in prediction markets.
Prediction markets allow participants to stake bets on the likelihood of an
event taking place. The price reflects the ‘market probability’ of the event, a sort
of aggregate of traders’ opinions. Prediction markets “have been used by decision-
makers in the U.S. Department of Defense, the health care industry, and by
multibillion-dollar corporations such as Eli Lilly, General Electric, Google, France
Telecom, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Siemens, and Yahoo” (Arrow et al.
2008).
Predictions markets have been shown to outperform polls in predicting
election results (Berg et al. 2008). Figure 3 compares the outcome predicted by
polls (represented by red circles) to that predicted by prediction markets
(represented by blue lines). The horizontal grey line depicts the election results.
Overall, prediction markets were closer to the election results about 75% of the
time.
Prediction markets are based on the assumption that people’s willingness to
bet reveals their subjective probability. However, as mentioned earlier, Keynes
sug gest ed that the amount of evidence people have to support their beliefs also
matters. We will now see how ignoring this aspect may lead to contradictions,
and how to solve these contradictions.
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Figure 3: “Implied vote-share margins for the market and polls. The vertical axis is the vote
margin; the horizontal axis is the date; the margin implied by the market is the solid moving
line; poll margins are represented by small circles; the horizontal lines indicate the election
outcome, the vertical lines are the beginnings and ends of conventions, debate days and
election days.” From Berg et al. (2008)
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3.2. The source method
In 1961, Ellsberg was the first to clearly establish the contradictions. Imagine
that there are two urns. The first one, called the “known urn”, has 50 red and 50
black balls. The second one, called the “unknown urn”, has 100 balls, red or black,
but in unknown proportion. Imagine you can win €100 if you draw a red ball;
which urn would you prefer to draw from? Imagine now that you can win €100
if you draw a black ball; which urn would you prefer to draw from? Most people
prefer to draw from the known urn (with 50 red and 50 black balls) in both cases,
acting as if the chance of drawing a red ball from the unknown urn is less than
50%, but also as if the chance of drawing a black ball from the same unknown
urn is less than 50%. It implies that they act as if their subjective probabilities do
not add up to 100%, which contradicts the mere notion of probability. This is
called the Ellsberg paradox. People dislike betting on unknown processes. This
phenomenon is called ambiguity aversion.
Consider only the second, unknown urn. A ball will be drawn from it. Would
you prefer to win €100 if the ball is red or if the ball is black? Most people would
be indifferent, meaning that red and black are equally likely. If two comple -
mentary events are equally likely, their probability must be 50%. To summarise,
people act as if the probability of red and the probability of black are both 50% if
they only bet on the unknown urn, but not if they can also bet on the known urn.
The conclusion is that you can still behave as if you have well-defined
subjective probability if you bet only on one type of uncertainty – one source of
uncer t ainty – but contradictions may arise when you compare two sources of
uncertainty. This concept of source of uncertainty was introduced and
extensively studied by Amos Tversky and his co-authors in the 1990s. As
suggested by Keynes, two events with the same probability, but with different
amount of evidence supporting the probabilities may not lead to the same
behaviour. Differences in behaviour reveals people’s confidence in their beliefs. 
Together with Mohammed Abdellaoui, Laetitia Placido, and Peter Wakker, I
developed the source method. We first studied choices related to a unique
source of uncertainty to derive people’s subjective probabilities (represented on
the x-axis of Figure 4), and we then obtained their willingness to bet (y-axis). The
willingness to bet, initially expressed in euros, was corrected to take into account
that everyone has his or her own subjective evaluation of money (what
economists call utility). 
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The willingness to bet obtained for subjective probabilities can then be
compared with the willingness to bet obtained with objective probability. The
Ellsberg example described above predicts that the willingness to bet on objec -
tive probabilities is higher than the willingness to bet on subjective probabi -
lities.
Moreover, together with Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky put forward an -
other phenomenon, called likelihood insensitivity. The difference between 0%
and 1% chance to win is substantial: in the former case you cannot win, in the
latter, you may. By contrast, the difference between 56% and 57% does not seem
big. This phenomenon explains the inverse-S shape of the willingness to bet
curve on objective probabilities: the curve may be quite flat around 50%. Now
imagine that you are not even sure whether these 56% and 57% probabilities are
accurate. It is then quite plausible that you will treat them as equivalent. The
difference seems even smaller, and the willingness to bet curve would be even
flatter. The less people know, the more they treat everything as 50-50. The
extreme case would be a horizontal line.
In an experiment using traditional Ellsberg urns, we indeed observed that
the willingness to bet curve for the unknown urn tended to be lower and
showed more likelihood insensitivity than the curve for the known urn. In an -
other experiment conducted in Paris, the same type of pattern appeared when
we compared willingness to bet on objective probabilities with willingness to
bet on the temperature one month later. Participants disliked betting on
temperature in a foreign country even more, as shown by the red dashed curve
in Figure 5.
To summarise this part, interpreting willingness to bet as subjective proba -
bilities can lead to contradictions. However, with the right theory, the contra -
dictions disappear and other aspects of people’s behaviour such as their liking or
disliking of a source of uncertainty, but also their likelihood insensitivity can be
measured.
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Figure 4: Willingness to bet on Ellsberg’s urn measured in utility units. From Abdellaoui et al.
(2011)
Figure 5: Willingness to bet on natural events measured in utility units. From Abdellaoui et
al. (2011)
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4. Measuring unverifiable truths 
4.1. The challenge
Scoring rules and prediction markets can be used to collect a judgment or an
opinion related to an observable event. They indeed require that either the event
on which the bet is defined or its complement actually occurs in order to
determine the score or who wins the bet. In a prediction market for elections, the
election winner is known in the end, and the bookmakers pay out the agreed-
upon amount to the bettors. 
But these methods cannot be applied to beliefs about unverifiable events. A
British astronomer once wrote that the odds of human civilisation surviving
beyond 2100 were no more than 50%. A prediction market for such an event is
not feasible, because if there is no human survival, punters will no longer be
alive to reap their rewards. Less dramatic events may also cause difficulties to
implement scoring rules and prediction markets. A scoring rule to reward
experts on global warming would only reward the good experts in 50 years or
more, when the actual consequences of global warming are known. Hence, it
would be too late, and anyhow, most of the current experts would probably not
be alive. Many theories about global warming are unverifiable in the short run,
but decisions have to be taken now. 
Other subjective truths we may want to measure, such as happiness or well-
being, are also not easily verifiable. Only you really know how you feel. So how can
we incentivise truthfulness if we cannot verify what the truth is? Another
example concerns health studies and asking people to report their behaviour.
Such health studies sometimes deal with unobservable taboo behaviour. Other
examples of unverifiable truths are hidden unethical practices or illegal activities.
In all of these examples, we would like to be sure to obtain truthful answers:
answers which are honest and carefully considered. Yet, telling the truth about
some taboo behaviour entails a psychological cost. Similarly, an expert carefully
considering an answer bears a cognitive cost. Rewarding people for telling the
truth is a way to compensate people for this cost in order to obtain more truthful
answers. 
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4.2.The solution(s)
It has long been thought that rewarding truth-telling for such unverifiable
truths was simply impossible. In 2004, Dražen Prelec, an MIT professor who is also
a visiting professor at our school, proposed a first solution, which he called a
Bayesian truth serum. It is based on a key intuition, well-known, in psychology.
What you think others would do, think, or feel is influenced by what you your -
selves would do, think, or feel in a similar situation. In 1977, Ross, Greene, and
House found that students who said they were shy expected 46% of other
students to say the same. However, non-shy students expected only 36% of
students to answer they were shy. Students reporting difficulties to control their
temper expected that the same would be reported by 42% of students. Yet,
students who said they had no difficulty to control their temper expected only
28% to say they had difficulty. The same pattern appeared for opinions about the
use of nuclear warfare or the discovery of extra-terrestrial life. People who agreed
with a statement expected more people to agree than those disagreeing with the
statement had expected. At the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s, this pattern
was thought to be irrational. It was called the false consensus bias. In 1989,
Dawes showed that this pattern can actually be perfectly rational. Using pure
Bayesian logics, he showed that your own answer is a signal that is informative
about the population and that two opposite answers will naturally move your
expectation about the rest of the population in two opposite directions.
Prelec used this reasoning to design a new type of scoring rule, which he
called a Bayesian truth serum. You are asked to answer a question and predict
what the others will answer. You are rewarded if your prediction is correct and
you get a bonus if your answer is more common than what others predict on
average. Bayesian reasoning tells us that your own truth is more common than
that predicted by others, and therefore, you should tell the truth. In other words,
Prelec proposed a way to adapt scoring rules to unverifiable truths. But could we
adapt prediction markets as well?
We know that a prediction market for the survival of humans beyond 2100
cannot work. But we could have a market in which people trade an asset whose
value will be the proportion of people agreeing with the pessimistic statement
of the British astronomer. Those who agree with the astronomer will expect a
higher asset value than those who disagree. The challenge that I plan to tackle in
the coming years is to design and implement such a market, which will reveal
people’s subjective truths, even if these truths are unverifiable.
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5. Conclusion
I hope I have convinced you that subjective truths, from people’s well-being
and expectations to experts’ predictions, play an increasing role in economics.
To measure people’s expectations, we need the right theories to rule out
contradictions and to be able to interpret what we observe. I presented the
source method, which interprets the willingness to bet with modern theories.
The source method allows us to disentangle subjective probabilities from
psychological phenomena such as likelihood insensitivity.
Finally, rewarding truth-telling when the truth is unverifiable is still a major
challenge. Developing a practical solution is one of my main research goals for
the coming years. Such a solution would complete the set of methods we, as
economists, have to objectively study subjective truths.
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6. Words of thanks
How thankful I am is a subjective truth. Hence, it provides a good oppor -
tunity to test what you remember of this lecture. 
Question 1: 
What can you infer from the following statement? “I think the proportion of
people who are grateful to Peter Wakker and Han Bleichrodt is even higher than
what people, on average, think.”
From this statement and the results of Ross, Greene and House (1977), you can
infer my subjective truth. Thank you, Han and Peter for giving me the chance to
work with you.
Question 2: 
What did John Neville Keynes call the “art of economics”?
As in every test, there is an easy question… The answer is “applied economics”. I
would like to thank my colleagues at the Department of Applied Economics,
faculty and staff, for the great work environment and the friendly atmosphere. I
am grateful to the successive department directors, Justus Veenman and Enrico
Pennings, for giving me the possibility to develop within the department. Thank
you, Kirsten, for your friendship but also for knowing how to plan and how to carry
out plans.
Question 3: 
Over the last 8 years, my gross salary has constantly increased. How do you
think my life satisfaction has evolved?
According to Kahneman and Deaton (2010), life satisfaction is positively
correlated with income. However, it may not be a causal relationship. Although an
increasing income surely played a role in my material well-being, the interaction
with our PhD students definitely had a strong positive impact on my professional
life satisfaction. I would like to thank our past and current PhD students for their
enthusiasm. I am also grateful to the Dean of the Erasmus School of Economics,
and to the directors of our research institutes (the Tinbergen Institute and ERIM)
for giving us the possibility to conduct research and to teach research.
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Question 4: 
Consider three bets yielding €10 if it rains on a given day in Ambierle (FR), in
Paris (FR), and in The Hague (NL) respectively. My willingness to bet is the highest
for “rain in The Hague” and the smallest for “rain in Ambierle”. What can you
infer?
Hint: I lived in each of the three places for at least 6 years.
As in every test, there is a trick question… Willingness to bet can reveal beliefs,
but not if the events belong to different sources of uncertainty. Two events with the
same probability, but with a different amount of evidence supporting the
probabilities may lead to different behaviour. But as I have lived in all three places,
I have considerable evidence for all. Hence, the willingness to bet does reveal my
beliefs.
I feel at home in Ambierle, in Paris, and in The Hague, because my friends and
my family are there. Thank you all for being here today, and thank you to my
friends, my family, and Oliver for being there for me.
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Aurélien Baillon (1980) is Endowed Professor of Economics of Uncertainty and a former
student of the École Normale Supérieure de Cachan, one of the French Grande Écoles. He joined
Erasmus School of Economics in 2007, after obtaining a research master at the Toulouse School
of Economics and a PhD at Arts et Métiers ParisTech. His research interests include decision
making under uncertainty and the measurement of people’s expectations and confidence. In the
past years, he has received important recognition for his research contributions, including a Veni
and a Vidi grant from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO.), and earlier
this year, a Starting Grant from the European Research Council (ERC). His research has been
published in leading journals, including the American Economic Review.
The focus of the lecture is the measurement of subjective truths. On the one hand,
economists heavily rely on hard numbers: GDP, growth rate, and exchange rates. On the other
hand, their explanations often rely on soft factors: executive confidence in the economy, consu -
mer sentiment, and investor expectations. The hard numbers are objective and agreed upon,
but the soft factors are subjective and depend on each individual. Economists increasingly
recognize the need to study subjective factors. After explaining the role of subjective truths in
modern economics, the lecture will show how to objectively measure subjective factors, even
though they may not be verifiable.
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onder -
zoek school) in the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding
participants of ERIM are the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus
School of Econo mics (ESE). ERIM was founded in 1999 and is officially accre dited by the
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research under taken by ERIM
is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and interfirm
relations, and its busi ness processes in their interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage ment, and to offer an
ad vanced doctoral pro gramme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred
senior researchers and PhD candidates are active in the different research pro grammes. From
a variety of acade mic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM commu nity is united in striving
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